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This study explores the possibility that local market power influences the observed asymmetric
relationship between changes in wholesale gasoline costs and changes in retail gasoline prices.  I
exploit an original data set of weekly gas station prices in Southern California from September 2002
to May 2003, and take advantage of detailed station and local market level characteristics to determine
the extent to which spatial differentiation influences price response asymmetry.  I find that brand
identity, proximity to rival stations, bundling and advertising, operation type, and local market features
and demographics each influence a station’s predicted price-response asymmetry.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The pricing dynamics of retail gasoline have resurfaced as an important policy issue in
the last few years. Of particular concern is the observed phenomenon that prices respond
asymmetrically to cost shocks–prices rise at a much faster rate with cost increases than
they do with cost declines. Research into the possible sources of this asymmetry remains
an ongoing concern. In this study, I investigate the extent to which local market power
may contribute to price asymmetry.
Past studies have found only limited support for the hypothesis that market power
inﬂuences pricing dynamics. Part of the diﬃculty is that for the retail sector in the gasoline
industry, market power occurs at the local or station level through geographic and other
forms of spatial diﬀerentiation. However, most gasoline pricing studies employ publicly
available aggregate data on prices, usually at a regional level. The few emerging studies
that take advantage of station-level data are generally cross-sections, which are unable by
deﬁnition to describe the types of pricing dynamics discussed here.
I overcome these data complications by collecting a station-level data set of weekly re-
tail gasoline prices from September 2002 to May 2003, which I use to examine how station-
speciﬁc characteristics such as location relative to competitors, consumers, and major in-
frastructures are potential sources of market power, and thus how they contribute to pricing
asymmetry at a micro level. In this paper, I establish that price-response asymmetry is a
dominant feature in my data set, and explore the possibility that certain station-level fea-
tures such as brand identity and other site- and local-market characteristics exhibit varying
degrees of asymmetry consistent with a positive local market power eﬀect. I assume that
each station has its own response to current and lagged cost and price changes, that these
eﬀects depend explicitly on its site- and local-market speciﬁc characteristics, and that these
eﬀects are themselves correlated with each other as a function of the geographic distance
between stations.
Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that, aggregated across all stations, three weeks after a singleton
1wholesale cost increase of 100c /, retail prices are predicted to rise an estimated 110c /; but
when costs fall by 100c /, retail prices only fall by 83c /. This 27c /d i ﬀerence, which I deﬁne
as the price-response asymmetry, declines gradually toward zero after the third week until
retail prices settle at their estimated long-run response. I also ﬁnd that brand identity
contributes measurably to asymmetry: three weeks after a wholesale cost shock, the asym-
metry for the highest-priced brands is estimated at 34c /, while for unbranded stations the
diﬀerence in responses is estimated at only 14c /. Regarding the beneﬁt of geographic isola-
tion, I ﬁnd that stations with no rivals in immediate proximity exhibit an asymmetry after
the third week that is approximately 7c / greater than if these same stations had a neighbor
immediately nearby. I also ﬁnd that after the third week following a cost shock, the dif-
ference in asymmetry for stations with greater versus lesser ease-of-access is approximately
20c /, diminishing slowly toward zero afterward. Similar results, though diﬀerent in mag-
nitude, are attributed to stations with a convenience store and to stations with relatively
more pumps on their lot. Lastly, I ﬁnd that more competitive local markets have a lower
price-response asymmetry by 10c / at the third week after a cost shock, while a one standard
deviation increase in the local market population size is associated with a 5c /i n c r e a s ei n
price-response asymmetry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I suggest a theoretical
link between market power and pricing asymmetry, and some of the existing empirical and
theoretical literature that supports it. In Section 3, I describe the basic empirical model and
demonstrate the existence of pricing asymmetry in my data set. I follow this up in Section
4 by introducing an empirical model that allows me to predict price-response asymmetry
for varying levels of the station characteristics. I subsequently estimate the model and
discuss the results and their implications for drawing a conclusion on the link between local
market power and price-response asymmetry. Concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research are oﬀered in Section 5.
22 Market Power as a Source of Price-Response Asymmetry
California consumers witnessed considerable volatility in retail gasoline prices in 2003, with
price spikes that surpassed those seen in the rest of the U.S.. Current industry analy-
sis attributes California’s price volatility to industry responses to a series of local supply
disruptions in a market where reﬁners typically operate near full capacity with limited ca-
pability to temporarily expand production. Figure 1 presents a chart of the retail prices for
the Los Angeles basin, along with corresponding spot prices for Los Angeles reformulated
gasoline.1
In addition to attributing price volatility in 2003 to an unusually high frequency of
supply disruptions, Figure 1 also demonstrates at a highly visible level the presence of
price-response asymmetry during this time period. During a supply shock, spot prices rise
quickly to clear the wholesale market for gasoline. Once the supply disruption is alleviated,
spot prices fall accordingly, though not quite so fast as they rose. Retail prices, however,
respond much more slowly to decreases in wholesale costs than increases; the reaction to
cost increases appears nearly immediate, while the reaction to cost decreases appears to
take several weeks.
In this study, I explore the possibility that the dynamic phenomena observed in gasoline
prices are inﬂuenced by local market power.2 In separate but related literatures, empirical
studies of the gasoline industry ﬁnd: (1) that stations do enjoy local market power that
derives from their ability to spatially diﬀerentiate their stores from potential competitors,3
and (2) that station-level pricing data are consistent with certain models of tacitly collusive
1Source data for the chart are from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The EIA also issued
a public report (EIA, 2003) at the request of the U.S. House Subcomittee on Energy Policy, detailing the
sources of the California supply shocks and their eﬀects on local prices. The identiﬁed shocks are listed in
Figure 1 where appropriate.
2Throughout this paper, market power is formally deﬁned as the ability of a ﬁrm to maintain its customer
base when the price diﬀerential between comparable own and rival goods increases.
3The seminal papers that establish local, retail-level market power in in the gasoline industry are Boren-
stein (1991) and Shepard (1991). Structural evidence of market power has also surfaced in the retail gasoline
literature recently, notably in Manuszak (2001), and Romley (2002). Hastings (2000) and Barron et al.
(2003) exploit natural or designed experiments on station-level pricing, also ﬁnding strong evidence of local,
station-level, market power.
3behavior.4 These empirical ﬁndings would seem to corroborate the hypothesis that price-
response asymmetry is ampliﬁed by the presence of stations with market power engaging
in tacit collusion with their neighbors. If true, we would expect to ﬁnd that variations in
local market power are positively correlated with ﬂuctuations in the measured asymmetry
of price responses to cost shocks.
The theoretical model that I use to link local market power to price-response asym-
metry is essentially built on the discussion in Borenstein and Shepard (1996), which oﬀers
a compelling summary of the theoretical argument for upstream cost-oriented asymmetry
in prices (markups). Rotemberg and Saloner (1986; hereafter RS), demonstrate a model
of tacit collusion that leads to price wars during unexpected demand shocks. Borenstein
and Shepard reinterpret the Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991; hereafter HH) reﬁnement
of the RS model, arguing that expectations of future cost changes result in asymmetric
price-responses depending on the direction of the cost change.
The underlying setup of these models is that ﬁrms play a repeated Bertrand game with
a grim trigger strategy. All ﬁrms face equivalent market demand and constant marginal
costs. In the absense of collusion, all ﬁrms charge marginal cost and earn zero economic
rents. In a perfectly collusive outcome, each ﬁrm charges the monopoly price and receives
1/n share of the monopoly economic rent. Under the grim trigger strategy, ﬁrms will
charge the collusive price so long as no ﬁrm deviates, but after a ﬁrm deviates, the other
ﬁrms respond by reverting to static Bertrand competition. Although the deviating ﬁrm
receives a one-period gain by stealing the market, in future periods he earns zero proﬁts.
Generally, provided the common discount factor is greater than (n − 1)/n,n oﬁrm will ever
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate and so all ﬁrms earn a positive markup in all periods.
RS modify the basic supergame model of tacit collusion by introducing stochastic, iid
demand shocks, the main aﬀect of which is that price wars occur when demand is high
4Slade (1992) ﬁnds evidence in the price war behavior of retail gasoline stations in Vancouver, BC that
is consistent with a kinked demand model of tacit collusion. Other models of tacit collusion have also been
considered for the retail gasoline industry. In particular, Borenstein and Shepard (1996) use a city-level
panel data set to show that US prices are consistent with a variant of Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1986) model
of tacit collusion.
4because in the near term collusive proﬁts are less than they would otherwise be.5 The
reduction in collusive proﬁts increases the incentive for any one ﬁrm to deviate, and so the
collusive price must temporarily fall to remove that incentive. The reverse is true when
demand is low.
HH further modify this basic model. Instead of stochastic iid demand shocks, they
imagine that the dynamic path of demand is deterministic (but changing). This leads to
a model where collusive prices and the ease of collusion depend not only on the level of
demand but also on the near-term future changes in demand. The main directional eﬀect
in HH is that, conditioning on the level of demand, collusive prices are increasing when
demand is increasing and decreasing when demand is decreasing. As with RS, this occurs
because of the eﬀect of near-term demand changes on the near-term proﬁts from collusion.
When demand is increasing, near-term collusive proﬁts increase, making collusion relatively
more sustainable.
Borenstein and Shepard (1996) note that the RS and HH models are trivially recast in
terms of dynamic changes in marginal cost rather than demand. It follows from the RS
model that if ﬁrms observe a high-cost state, then near-term future collusive proﬁts are
relatively higher because costs are expected to fall in the next period. This makes collusion
easier to sustain and leads to higher collusive markups. Conversely, when ﬁrms observe a
low-cost state, collusive markups will fall because costs are expected to increase in the next
period. This logic follows into the HH model: markups should be increasing when future
costs are decreasing, and markups should be decreasing when future costs are increasing.
In each of these models, we obtain a result where prices respond asymmetrically to cost
changes.
Both RS and HH identify the same underlying dependence between the number of ﬁrms
in the market and the common discount factor that exists in the basic supergame model of
5The statement "demand is high" in the RS model means that ﬁrms observe a current period demand
shock that exceeds μ, the expected value of demand. Since demand is iid, the following period’s expectation
of demand is μ, and so each ﬁrm’s expectation of near-term collusive proﬁts is lower relative to the potential
gains from cheating today. This is because each ﬁrm expects tomorrow’s demand shock to be lower than
today’s realization of demand.
5tacit collusion: collusion is assured if the discount factor δ is such that δ ≥ (n − 1)/n = δ,
and perfect collusion (monopoly pricing) is assured when δ ≥ b δ, where b δ>δ denotes the
discount factor above which monopoly pricing is the best achievable collusive price where
no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. This relationship implies that collusion is easier to
sustain the fewer the number of ﬁrms there are in the market. To derive a prediction
on what happens to price-response asymmetry when the number of ﬁrms changes, I focus
on what happens when δ = δ. In the HH model, the only sustainable collusive price path
when δ = δ is one where proﬁts don’t change as costs change. Under Bertrand competition,
this would imply that markups must remain constant as costs change, or that the price-
response asymmetry cannot exist when δ = δ. The asymmetry only occurs when δ>δ.




. Since δ is increasing in n, it follows that the range of asymmetry-inducing δ values
is decreasing in n. In other words, we are more likely to observe price-response asymmetry
when there are fewer ﬁrms in the market.
Although the relationship between price-response asymmetry and the number of ﬁrms
is inuitively appealing, it doesn’t actually provide an indication of what should happen to
price-response asymmetry as market power changes. This is because ﬁrm-level market
power does not exist in the RS and HH models as described, regardless of the number of
ﬁrms in the market. For there to be market power under Bertrand-style competition, we
must introduce product diﬀerentiation into the model.
A number of papers have augmented the basic supergame model of tacit collusion to
introduce product diﬀerentiaion. In general, this literature concludes that greater degrees
of product diﬀerentiation lower the critical discount factor above which collusion is sustain-
able.6 Put another way, the basic ﬁnding of this particular literature is that collusion is
6This relationship is not always monotonic. Speciﬁcally, Ross (1992) derives a U-shaped relationship
between product diﬀerentiation and the critical discount rate when inverse demand is linear in the quantity
purchased of both goods. The critical discount rate equals one when the goods are perfect substitutes, and
approaches one again when the goods have zero substitutability. For a large portion of Ross’ measure of
substitutability, the more homogeneous the goods, the less stable is the cartel. Ross (1992) also demon-
strates that under a spatial, Hotelling-style model of preferences, the critical discount rate is monotonically
decreasing in the degree of homogeneity, i.e., the more homogeneous the two products, the less stable is the
cartel. Chang (1991) independently conﬁrms that in a model of spatial competition, the critical discount
6generally found to be easier to sustain the less homogeneous are the goods in the market.7
Finally, to the extent that this result mirrors the earlier results regarding the eﬀect of the
number of ﬁrms on the critical discount factor and price-response asymmetry, we should
expect that price-response asymmetry will decrease the more homogeneous are the ﬁrms in
the market.
Empirically, the evidence in support of a market power eﬀect on pricing asymmetry
has been sparse. Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997; henceforth BCG) attempt to
empirically distinguish among several competing hypotheses for the source of the asymme-
try. They ﬁnd that the asymmetry between retail prices and terminal costs is consistent
with a model of tacit cooperation where ﬁrms use the preceding period’s price as a focal
point. But the ﬁnding is not deﬁnitive, as their results are also consistent with a consumer
search hypothesis. In the follow-up literature spawned by BCG, much of the attention is
placed on identifying a market power eﬀect at upstream levels in the gasoline industry, as
in Borenstein and Shepard (2002), which ﬁnds that market power augments the asymmetry
of wholesale cost responses to crude oil price changes.
An initial pass at the potential for a market power eﬀect at a disaggregate retail level was
attempted in Lewis (2003) by estimating an error correction model similar to the base model
(Equation (4)) in this paper, but separately for the lowest and highest margin stations in the
sample. Lewis ﬁnds no measurable market power eﬀect. Deltas (2004) exploits markup
diﬀerences across US states with a panel of monthly data to ﬁnd evidence of a positive
market power eﬀect on asymmetry. The empirical approach in Deltas is directly analogous
to the strategy in Lewis, although I argue later that it is not an approach I can follow here
factor is monotonically increasing as the products become closer substitutes. This result is shown to be
robust to endogenous product location choice in Chang (1992), Hackner (1995), and Hackner (1996). Gupta
and Venkatu (2002) argue that a common theme among the above listed papers is the assumption of mill
pricing. They demonstrate that if ﬁrms instead use delivered pricing, then the result is reversed, i.e., the
critical discount factor that sustains collusion is monotonically decreasing as ﬁrms locate closer together.
7This ﬁnding contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom. Stigler (1964) and Carlton and Perloﬀ
(2005) both argue that product homogeneity should enhance the formation and stability of collusion, largely
because it is presumptively easier to detect cheating in homogeneous product markets than in heterogeneous
ones. The supergame literature (supra note 6) that explicitly incorporates product diﬀerentiation and
ﬁnds that product heterogeneity aids collusive price setting implicitly assumes that ﬁrms can perfectly and
costlessly detect cheating by rival ﬁrms.
7with a station-level analysis.
3 Price-Response Asymmetry in Gasoline Markets
Estimation of a local market power eﬀect on price-response asymmetry requires a disaggre-
gate (preferably station-level), high frequency panel data set of retail prices, costs, and sales.
I am aware of no publicly available data set that meets this criterion at the station-level,
so from July 2002 to May 2003, I collected weekly price observations for the South Orange
County region of California.8 I augmented this data set with block-group data from the
2000 Census, which includes information on household incomes, housing values, commute
statistics, and other relevant local demand- and cost-proxy variables. I also collected phys-
ical features of the stations such as lot size, number of pumps, the presence of a convenience
store and other characteristics. New Image Marketing, Ltd. graciously provided me with
station-level information on the operation types (Jobber, Lessee-Dealer) for a portion of the
population, and I was able to complete these data by interviewing station managers for the
remainder of the population. For this part of the study I use publicly available spot prices
on Los Angeles reformulated gasoline as a measure of wholesale costs.9 Lastly, I calculated
geographic distances between stations by collecting latitude and longitude information with
a GPS unit.
As shown in Figure 2, the geography of South Orange County makes it an ideal study
area for this analysis. The region exhibits a nearly complete natural market boundary,
which helps to avoid the potential arbitrariness of traditional market boundaries at, say, a
speciﬁed street or arterial when there may be stations on the excluded side of the boundary
that are valid rivals.10 Additionally, according to the 2000 Census, approximately 99% of
8Lundberg Survey oﬀers the closest match for this study’s data requirements. Unfortunately, I found
that Lundberg Survey is currently unwilling to make its data publicly available, even for sale.
9I was also able to obtain weekly rack prices by brand for the study period. Unfortunately, these data
are diﬃcult to use at the station level because Arco and Mobil, which together comprise approximately 1/3
of the market, do not participate in the rack market. In line with their organizational structures, Arco and
Mobil sell directly to stations at Dealer Tank Wagon prices that are generally not available to the public (cf
earlier footnote regarding Lundberg Survey).
10The study area is bordered by the Laguna Canyon wildlife preserve to the north, the Cleveland National
Forest to the East, Camp Pendleton Marine Base to the south, and the Paciﬁc Ocean to the West. While
8the South Orange County residents work more than 5 miles from their homes, while over
40% commute more than 25 miles from their homes, with the predominant work destination
lying in Central/North Orange County and in Los Angeles County. That the majority
of commuters are traveling outside of the main study region for work has an important
implication for competition between stations within the region. Competition between
submarkets in the study area should be highly localized, in that it may be reasonable to
assume that stations within the region are competing against each other primarily for those
consumers who purchase gasoline near their homes. While there is a relevant outside good
beyond the study region, consumers should prefer it relative to their own local stations in
a roughly equal manner throughout the study region. As a result, the following analyses
model prices as if I were dealing with the entire population of relevant stations, assuming
away any location-speciﬁcb i a s e st h a tm i g h ta r i s ei fs o m es t a t i o n sw e r em o r ep r i c e - s e n s i t i v e
to the outside good than others.
The study period itself covers a combination of cost shocks that resulted in a run-
up of wholesale and retail prices in late 2002 and early 2003, as well as a sharp decline
in wholesale costs in April of 2003. Average retail prices and wholesale spot prices are
charted in Figure 3, which illustrates the December-March price run-up, the April-May
decline and stabilization of prices, as well as a cyclical November decline in wholesale costs.
Additionally, the charted prices demonstrate the underlying asymmetry, with retail prices
appearing to rise much faster with cost increases than they fall with cost decreases. I exploit
these data series, in addition to variation in retail prices at the station level, to estimate the
asymmetric relationship between wholesale cost and retail prices changes. Table 1 provides
summary statistics for these data, ﬁrst at average levels, then broken down by positive and
negative one-period changes.
there are gasoline tanks and fueling stations at Camp Pendleton, none are available to the general public.
93.1 An empirical model of price-response asymmetry
In order to model the dynamic nature of gasoline prices and their relationship to wholesale
costs, I initially consider an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model of the form:






γksps,t−k + ust, (1)
where pst denotes the retail gasoline price for station s at time t, ct−j is the wholesale spot
price for gasoline at period t − j, and ust is assumed to be white noise.11 By construction,
(1) allows for short-term ﬂuctuations in price levels as a function of recent prices and costs.
Yet economic theory informs us that prices and costs should be governed by a long term
relationship that sees prices increasing with costs. If we ﬁx costs at some level c, so that
ct = ct−1 = ... = ct−J−1 = c, and take the conditional expectation of (1), we get (asumming
stationarity and ergodicity)






γksE (ps,t−k|{ct} = c)
= αs + c
J+1 P
j=0




















= e αs + θsc.
This representation has several appealing features. First, it describes the long-run
relationship between expected prices and costs. But moreover, it also gives the parameters
of the model simple economic interpretations. If we deﬁne the markup between prices
and costs as mst = pst − ct, then the expected markup is E (mst|ct = c)=e αs +( θs − 1)c.
When combined with the derivative of (2) with respect to c, ∂E (pst|{ct} = c)/∂c = θ, then,
11Duﬀy-Deno (1996) provides a wide summary of the empirical literature on price-response asymmetry
to wholesale cost changes in the gasoline industry, and the diﬀerent methods applied to estimate the rela-
tionship. At a high level, there seem to be two general approaches: partial adjustment and error correction
models.
10conditional on some value for c we can elicit direct a priori knowledge of the parameters e αs
and θs.θ s is the long-run response of expected prices to a one-time shift in costs, while
e αs is backed out as the intercept that rationalizes our information on expected station-level
markups; in the unique case that θs =1 , e αs is exactly equal to the long-run expected
markup.
Because the parameters e αs and θs provide such direct interpretation, most empirical
studies of the gasoline industry choose to reparameterize (1) so that e αs and θs are directly
estimated in the model.12 By working with the identities ∆pst = pst − ps,t−1 and ∆ct =








e γsk∆ps,t−k + λs (ps,t−1 − e αs − θsct−1)+ust, (3)







, e αs and θs are deﬁned as above, and e βsj and e γsk are speciﬁc
to the number of initial price and costs lags in the levels speciﬁcation.
After reparameterization, the remaining parameters in the ECM are also easily inter-
preted. The coeﬃcients on the changes in spot prices, e βsj, represent the short-run price
adjustments in retail prices to changes in costs for station s,a n dt h ee γsk coeﬃcients rep-
resent short-run responses for station s to own-changes in retail prices during the last K
periods. The error correction term, ps,t−1 − e αs −θsct−1, can be thought of as the (one pe-
riod lagged) deviation in prices from their long-run expected relationship with costs, which
means that λs is the short-run correction in current prices that helps bring retail prices back
to their equilibrium relationship with costs. When prices exceed costs by more than the
12See, for example, BCG, Balke et al. (1998), and Lewis (2003).
13For example, if J=K=2, then
pst = αs + β0sct + β1sct−1 + β2sct−2 + β3sct−3 + γ1ps,t−1 + γ2ps,t−2 + γ3ps,t−3 + ust.
We then make the following substitutions: plug in ps,t−1+∆pst for pst on the left, and on the right substitute
ct−1 + ∆ct for ct, ct−1 − ∆ct−1 for ct−2, ct−1 − ∆ct−1 − ∆ct−2 for ct−3,p s,t−1 − ∆ps,t−1 for ps,t−2, and
ps,t−1 − ∆ps,t−1 − ∆ps,t−2 for ps,t−3. With these substitions, we get
∆pst = h β0s∆ct + h β1s∆ct−1 + h β2s∆ct−2 + h γ1s∆ps,t−1 + h γ2s∆ps,t−2 + λs (ps,t−1 − h αs − θsct−1)+ust,
where h β0s = β0s, h β1s = −β2s − β3s, h β2s = −β3s, h γ1s = −γ2s − γ3s, h γ2s = −γ3s,λ s = γ1s + γ2s + γ3s − 1,
h αs = −αs/λs, and θs = −(β0s + β1s + β2s + β3s)/λs.
11long-run markup, we would expect downward pressure on current prices until the long-run
markup is restored, and thus I expect λs to be negative.
Estimation of the ECM in traditional studies is usually performed in two stages: ﬁrst,
regress pst on ct−1 and a set of station dummies, then second, construct vs,t−1 = ps,t−1−b αs−
b θsct−1 and substitute these residuals in place of the error correction term in a least squares
regression of (3).14 Alternative practices are to perform unrestricted least squares (see BCG
and Balke et al. 1998) of (3) after rewriting it to be linear in the covariates, or simultaneous
one-stage estimation on (3) directly (see Lewis 2003) via nonlinear least squares or maximum
likelihood. In this paper I advocate joint estimation of all the parameters in the context
of a nonlinear Bayesian regression.15 Earlier studies have relied on an assumption that
if demand is linear in the long-run and marginal costs are truly constant across quantity,
there should be 100% pass-through of costs to prices, implying that θs should be close to
1. Prior information on θs can range anywhere from relatively diﬀuse, allowing the data
to reveal the implied long-term trend, to very dogmatic at θs =1with certainty, analogous
to the ﬁnal approach taken in Lewis (2003) after the one-step procedure there revealed an
estimated θs > 1.
Asymmetry in the ECM is introduced by allowing separate coeﬃcients for positive and
negative changes in retail prices and wholesale costs. Letting I(·) denote the indicator
function, which takes on the value 1 when the interior condition (·) is met, a parsimonious
14This procedure is generally adopted out of concern that retail spot prices and wholesale costs are
cointegrated, which occurs when the data generating process for wholesale costs is a unit root process
and there is a 1:1 mapping between prices and costs. When true, this implies that prices are regressed on
nonstationary covariates in the ARDL model, so that the standard sampling properties of the OLS estimator
are no longer applicable. The two-step procedure in the ECM avoids this issue, since vs,t−1 is stationary
once we "know" h αs and θs, and there are no longer any nonstationary regressors in the model. See Engle
and Granger (1987) for a discussion of the asymptotic eﬃciency of this two-step procedure.
15There is an important identiﬁcation problem for one-step and likelihood-based estimation of the ECM.
At λ =0 , the parameters in the error correction term (h αs and θs) are unidentiﬁed. One method for handling
this would be to perform some form of restricted nonlinear least squares or restricted maximum likelihood
estimation where λ is allowed to take on, say, only negative values. This would be analogous to a Bayesian
procedure that placed zero prior mass on λ ∈ [0,∞). Bauwens et al. (1999) propose a joint prior between
λ and (h αs,θ s) that places zero prior probability on the event λ =0 . Another alternative is to allow the
local non-identiﬁcation and to just use a proper prior on λ, h αs, and θs; so long as the prior is proper, even
if the likelihood does not identify the parameter, the posterior will still be a proper distribution. Moreover,
provided the likelihood favors values away from the locally nonidentiﬁed point (λ =0 ) , learning will occur
and the posterior will be updated.


















sk + e γ+
skI(∆ps,t−k > 0)
¢
+λs (ps,t−1 − e αs − θsct−1)+ust.
(4)
Under this construction, for a negative unit cost shock, the short-run contribution to the
change in price is e β
−
sj, while for a positive cost shock, the contribution is e β
−
sj + e β
+
sj.
Past studies have illustrated the estimated asymmetry graphically via the diﬀerence in
cumulative response functions (CRFs).16 T h eC R Fp o s i t sas i n g l es h o c ki nw h o l e s a l ec o s t s
at time t, and subsequently describes the path of cumulative price changes until prices settle
at the equilibrium value associated with the new cost level. Without loss of generality, set
pst = e αs and ct =0(so that prices are currently at their long-run equilibrium), and then
let ∆ct+1 =1 . In addition, since we want to plot the CRF in the positive domain for both
positive and negative shocks, assume that ∆ct+1 is just the magnitude of the cost shock.
Then the change in retail prices at t+1for a negative shock is ∆ps,t+1 = e β
−
s0. At t+2, the





s1 + e γ+
s1I(∆ps,t+1 > 0)
¢
+λs (ps,t+1 − θs).
The pattern is relatively simple–at each period, the CRF is just the previous period’s
predicted price plus the predicted change in prices in the current period:
CRF −

















s,t+f. Lastly, I deﬁne an asymmetry function, As,t+f, as the diﬀerence between the
positive and negative CRFs, i.e.,
As,t+f = CRF +
s,t+f − CRF −
s,t+f. (6)
Note that this diﬀerence is not just β+
s,f−1, since the price response for each cost change
(positive or negative), at each period, depends on the past history of price changes as well.
In the sections that follow, I ﬁrst establish the presence of asymmetry in the data across
16This is the approach taken in BCG and Lewis(2003).
13stations. To implement this basic version of the model, I specify that all of the station-
speciﬁce ﬀects, i.e., e βsj, e γsj,λ s, and θs are constant across stations (e.g., θs = θ ∀ s), and
that station-level markups are ﬁxed constants. After establishing this basic asymmetry, I
then explore the data further by introducing random eﬀects for each of the coeﬃcients and
interact them with the observed station-varying characteristics in my data. The random
coeﬃcients model is explained in more detail later.
3.2 Prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks
For all of the coeﬃcients in the model, I ﬁnd that the posterior distributions are dominated
by the likelihood, generally with high posterior precision. Summary output of the marginal
posterior distributions is oﬀered in Table A1, but not discussed here for brevity and ease of
exposition. A discussion of the prior speciﬁcation employed for this analysis is also oﬀered
in the appendix.
Pricing asymmetry is evidenced by the estimated CRFs in Figure 4a. We see that
during the ﬁrst 8 weeks after a wholesale cost shock, with the exception of week 2, retail
prices respond more strongly to a cost increase than they do to a cost decrease. This
ﬁnding appears to be statistically strong, i.e., precisely estimated, as well–the 95% equal-
tail probability intervals for each CRF do not overlap save for the exception at week 2 and
after week 8, where the two CRFs converge at the long run average eﬀect. The posterior
asymmetry function, illustrated in Figure 4b, also demonstrates this ﬁnding, with 95% of
its mass centered on values greater than zero for all periods except week 2. The sharp
change in the second week following a cost shock indicates that, on average, stations in my
sample temporarily but signiﬁc a n t l ys l o wd o w nt h er a t eo fr e s p o n s et oc o s ti n c r e a s e sd u r i n g
the second week, while for a cost decrease, the temporary ﬂattening of the response rate
occurs during the third week.
Regarding estimation of the long-term relationship between retail prices and wholesale
costs, I ﬁnd that the system at ﬁrst appears potentially nonstationary. The coeﬃcient on
lagged costs in the error correction term is centered at 1.38 with a standard deviation of 0.02
14and a posterior probability that it exceeds unity arbitrarily close to 1. This occurs despite
the nearly dogmatic prior imposed on this coeﬃcient, which is centered at 1 with a standard
deviation of 0.1/6. One explanation of this result is that I work with a relatively short
sample period relative to other studies, the end of which sees average markups settling at a
value greater than they were initially at the start of the sample. Yet, while BCG estimate
this coeﬃcient to be approximately 1 with relatively small standard error, Lewis (2003) also
ﬁnds a value larger than 1 under one-stage estimation (b η ≈ 1.5 with standard error 0.29
in that study), despite having 92 weekly observations compared to my 39. On balance,
it would appear that the data strongly favor θ>1, especially in light of the of the data
signiﬁcantly updating my highly informative prior speciﬁcation.
One response to this apparently strong result is to follow Lewis’ study and reestimate
the model under a still more dogmatic prior, perhaps by setting θ =1with certainty.
Instead, I think the appropriate response in this study is to accept the data as properly
informative about the nature of the residual demand facing each station. A possible
alternative economic explanation of θ>1 to the statistical one just described is that each
station may exhibit constant elasticity for it’s residual demand (as opposed to linear residual
demand). Bulow and Pﬂeiderer (1983) show that under constant elasticity of demand, the
price response to a change in marginal cost is ∂p/∂c = η/(η +1 ), where for a ﬁrm that
faces imperfect substitutes the elasticity η is less than −1. While I would stress that
this is a highly stylized assumption, if indeed the stations in my dataset face constant
elasticty residual demand, the implied average station-level elasticity when θ =1 .38 is
η = −3.63. This number is consistent with the elasticities found in Barron et al. (2003),
but considerably less elastic than the ﬁndings in Romley (2002).
4S p a t i a l D i ﬀerentiation and Price-Response Asymmetry
The most direct approach to exploring a local market power eﬀect on price-response asym-
metry is the procedure adopted by Deltas (2004), which interacts observed markups with
the ∆ct−j and ∆pt−k terms in the ECM. While this strategy is eﬃcacious at the aggregate
15level, it can lead to spurious conclusions at the station level. At an aggregate level, the unit
of observation is the average retail price for a given region. To the extent that the major-
ity of regions studied do not diﬀer drastically in their organizational makeup, the average
cost across regions will vary across regions largely as a function only of regional-speciﬁc
wholesale spot prices, which are readily observable to the researcher.
But at the station-level, the observed markup of retail price minus wholesale cost is not
the true markup. The actual marginal cost faced by a station varies across stations. In
general, I expect a station’s marginal cost to depend proportionally on the wholesale spot
price of gasoline, i.e.,
c∗
s = as + bsc.
While the spot price of gasoline is constant for all stations in a common regional market, the
marginal costs across stations will not be. For example, suppose, as this study ﬁnds, that
salary-operated (company owned and operated) stations have a markup over spot prices
that is less than that for lessee-dealer stations. One would be tempted to conclude, by the
Lerner index measure of market power l =( p − c)/p, that salary-operated stations exhibit
lower local market power than lessee-dealer stations. This conclusion is premature–if
the industry wisdom is correct that salary-operated stations have lower marginal costs than
lessee-dealer, then, although the salary-operated stations charge lower prices, their markups
may not be lower than those of lessee-dealer stations, and could even be greater.
Ideally, if I had cost data that was a better approximation of marginal costs at the station
level–say, rack (terminal) price data for the independent stations and Dealer Tank Wagon
(DTW) price data for the company owned stations–then I could follow the procedure
employed by Deltas (2004) and compare the implied pricing asymmetries across stations
with observed diﬀerences in markups.17 Unfortunately, DTW price data proved to be
unavailable for public sale. With 40% of my stations characterized as lessee-dealer, if I were
to instead proxy station-level marginal costs with rack price data, I would be introducing a
17DTW is the price a dealer charges a station for both the gasoline and the delivery together. Company-
owned, lessee-dealer stations purchase their gasoline at the DTW price.
16non-ignorable sampling bias into my estimation of each station’s markup.
Rather than introducing markups directly into the ECM as just suggested, I build on
the evidence suggested in other studies of the gasoline industry that spatial diﬀerentiation
can inﬂuence a station’s local market power. By interacting station-level characteristics
with the cost- and price-change variables in the ECM, I can then predict the inﬂuence of
that characteristic on a station’s price-response asymmetry. By association, I can then
derive an implied relationship between market power and price-response asymmetry. For
example, Romley (2002) ﬁnds that branding (speciﬁcally, upgrading to a Chevron station)
c a nd e c r e a s eas t a t i o n ’ so w n - p r i c ee l a s t i c i t yf r o m1 1 . 4t o8 . 8 ,w h i c hc o r r e s p o n d st oa3p e r -
centage point increase in the Lerner index and therefore an increase in market power. A
ﬁnding in this study that branded stations demonstrate greater price-response asymmetry
than unbranded stations would thus suggest that not only do stations pass through cost
increases faster than decreases, but local market power achieved through brand diﬀerenti-
ation allows this diﬀerence in pass through rates to be greater for branded stations than it
is for unbranded.
Ie x p l o r et h ei n ﬂuence of spatial diﬀerentiation on price-response asymmetry by con-
sidering a wide set of station-level characteristics. Section 3 describes the data set and its
collection procedure. From these data I selected a subset of characteristics that I think are
most likely to inﬂuence a station’s market power. Among those selected are brand identity,
the presence of a carwash, service station, or convenience store, and the station’s lot size.
Additionally I look at demand shifters that can be proxied by market demographics such
as local household income and the size of the local population.18 Other characteristics
that I consider are site-speciﬁc features such as distance from the nearest major freeway,
the density of pumps (pumps per acre), and ease-of-access variables such as the number of
driveways, whether any of the driveways has a traﬃc light, and whether the primary arte-
rial is divided or not.19 I also look at other local market characteristics such as whether
18I determine the values for local market demographics by associating all of the block groups within 1 mile
of a station as comprising the relevant local market. I then construct the average value of the characteristic
across the selected block groups.
19Much of South Orange County is newer, planned development, and a common street design is to include
17the land use in immediate proximity to the station is residential or commercial, whether
a competitor’s pricing is directly visible from the station, and whether the station itself is
contained in a shopping center. Lastly, I include the station’s organizational relationship
with its parent reﬁnery as a proxy for a cost shifter.20 Summary statistics and the incidence
of these site and local market characteristics are described in Table 2.
4.1 Empirically estimating station-level variation in price-response asym-
metry
I argue above that by interacting spatial characteristics with the short- and long-run changes
in costs and prices, I can predict separate asymmetric relationships associated for each
characteristic while controlling for the eﬀect of other spatial features. I accomplish this in
the ECM model speciﬁed in equation (4) by allowing each station to have its own random
coeﬃcient on the cost and price change variables. I then describe the station-level variation






























e α =( e α1,...,e αS)
0 ∼ N (Wα∗,A),
where, for notational convenience, I stack both the cost- and price-change coeﬃcients into a







these assumptions, the model is now described as a hierarchical error correction model (H-
ECM) that centers each covariate in (4) at a linear combination of the L observed station-
level characteristics in the vector ws. Hence, β∗ is the (J + K)L vector of coeﬃcients in
the second-stage analysis. Alternatively, if we integrate over the distributional assumption
highway dividers which restrict left-turn access into commercial centers.
20Generally speaking, stations can be independently owned and operated, jobber owned and operated,
or company (reﬁnery) owned and either lessee-dealer or company operated. Industry wisdom holds that
company owned and operated stations have the lowest wholesale costs while independent and lessee-dealer
stations have the highest wholesale costs.
18on e βs,β ∗ is the coeﬃcient vector on the interaction terms between the covariates in xst and
ws. Similarly, λ∗,θ ∗, and α∗ are the L vectors of coeﬃcients for the remaining parameters.
The hierarchical setting of this model is a ﬂexible and convenient method of introducing
station-level variation in the ﬁrst-stage regression coeﬃcients. We can think of the hierar-
chical speciﬁcation as implying a sort of two-stage regression, where we might ﬁrst estimate
a separate ECM equation for each station, and then subsequently regress each of the coeﬃ-
cients from the ﬁrst stage on the corresponding station-level covariates. In contrast to this
approach, the H-ECM estimates all of the parameters in the implied two-stage approach
jointly. Additionally, it allows for spatial correlation to be speciﬁed in the station-speciﬁc
eﬀects. While the normality assumption may at ﬁrst appear restrictive, it is also appealing
in that it implies the marginal distribution of ∆pst is also normal when the residual ust is
normal, and is thus no more restrictive than the classical normal linear regression model
with interaction terms and a speciﬁc form of heteroskedasticity.
In my data set, I observe a limited number of demand and cost variables at the sta-
tion level. To the extent that diﬀerencing prices over time removes any time-invariant
unobserved correlation across stations as a result of spatial diﬀerentiation, the ECM is ap-
propriately modeled with independent covariates for the short-run cost and price changes.
However, the long-run markups depend explicitly on each station’s degree of spatial diﬀer-
entiation. Out of concern that the observed spatial characteristics in the data may not
completely describe each station’s long-run markup, in particular with regard to my local
market demand proxies from the census data, I allow for spatial correlation in the markups
as a function of the distance between stations. In the hierarchical speciﬁcation above, this
spatial dependence occurs in the covariance matrix A in the distribution of the station-
speciﬁc markups e αs. Following Banerjee, Carlin and Gelfand (2004), I describe A with a




α exp(−φαdij) if i 6= j
τ2
α + σ2
α if i = j
.
This speciﬁcation for the covariance between stations implies that the spatial dependence
19is decreasing with the distance dij between stations, and is always nonnegative.21
4.2 Price-response asymmetry varies with a station’s spatial characteris-
tics
As mentioned above, my empirical strategy for identifying a local market power eﬀect on
pricing asymmetry is to allow station-speciﬁc price responses to a cost shock and then to
compare the resulting predictive asymmetry functions across station-level characteristics.
A summary table of the estimated eﬀects of the covariates on retail gasoline markups is
provided in Table A2, while Table A3 provides information on the posterior distribution
of the short-run coeﬃcient parameters. Unfortunately, the information contained in these
two tables is somewhat overwhelming, and as a result I concentrate my discussion of the
eﬀect of the covariates on pricing asymmetry to the graphical analyses below.22,23,24
Still, there are some parameters in the model that are directly interpretable regarding
the eﬀect of station characteristics on pricing dynamics. In Table 3, I present a summary of
the posterior distribution for λ∗, the coeﬃcients in the "auxilliary regression" of the station-
level λ parameters on the characteristics described in Table 2. To interpret this summary
output, recall that we expect λ to be negative if stations exhibit a tendency to return to
a long-run linear relationship between retail and spot prices, so that negative values for
the coeﬃcients λ∗ indicate characteristics which speed up the return to equilibrium while
positive values slow down this response. Among the results in Table 3 that indicate a
market-power eﬀect on station-level pricing dynamics are the eﬀects of nearby competition
and the presence of carwashes and convenience stores at a site. In general, it appears that
most branded stations return to their long-run equilibrium price-cost relationships faster
21The nonnegative property of the exponential covariance function implies that the spatial correlation
b e t w e e ns t a t i o n si sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e . T h i si sas i g n i ﬁcant limitation of most simple models of spatial depen-
dence. While a more complicated speciﬁcation may allow for a nonmonotonic covariance function in dij, as
a practical matter the markups in my data set appear to be highly positively correlated.
22I consider an ECM model with J =3cost-change lags and K =2price-change lags, each of which has
both a positive and a negative coeﬃcient. Each of these 10 coeﬃcients, plus the coeﬃcients in the long-run
relationship is associated with the 31 station-level characteristics described in Table 2, which results in 403
total coeﬃcient parameters in the model.
23As with the basic model, I have also included details on the prior speciﬁcation and estimation procedure
in the appendix.
24See the discussion that follows for a possible explanation for the Arco and Mobil diﬀerence.
20than unbranded stations, with the exception of Arco and Mobil.
Although a tabular approach has limited appeal in this paper, a diagrammatic one
does illustrate well the predictive eﬀect of the station characteristics on price-response
asymmetry. In Figure 5, I provide the results of a predictive analysis for the eﬀect of being
a salary-operated (company-operated) station relative to being lessee-dealer operated. A
nonlinear predictive analysis like that contained in the CRFs and asymmetry functions must
condition on values for the other covariates yet also try to isolate the marginal eﬀect of a
particular characteristic. In order to achieve this, I determine the predictive CRF for all
of the stations in my sample, and then generate a separate set of predictive CRFs for all
of the stations but change the status of the salary-operated stations to lessee dealer, which
gives me an as-if predictive result: if, all else being equal, the salary-operated stations were
instead lessee-dealer, what would their cumulative response function look like? The average
(across salary-operated stations) diﬀerence between the two CRFs and their associated
asymmetry functions yields the marginal eﬀect on the pricing dynamic of being a salary-
operated station.
For example, in Figure 5a, I plot the mean of the predictive CRF for both a positive and
negative cost shock for the salary-operated stations. An analogous plot is oﬀered in panel
b after changing their status to lessee-dealer. Panel c compares the posterior mean of the
asymmetry functions for each type (salary-operated versus lessee-dealer), and panel d gives
the full posterior distribution of the diﬀerence between the asymmetry functions. While
panels a-c oﬀer the most interesting picture of what is happening with prices across these
two predictives, panel d yields the most important information on the diﬀerence in price
responses between them. At each week following a single $1 cost shock I draw a boxplot for
the posterior distribution of the diﬀerence between the predictive price-response asymmetry
of salary-operated stations and their predictive asymmetry after switching them to lessee-
dealer stations. The central point of the boxplot corresponds to the posterior median of
this diﬀerence, which I have linked across weeks in the solid line connecting each boxplot.
The upper and lower lines of the rectangular boxes in each boxplot correspond to the 75th
21and 25th percentiles of the distribution respectively, while the lines leading out of the box
give an idea of the basic range of the distribution (note, they do not imply a 95% interval,
which is entirely contained within this range).
The series of boxplots in Figure 5d therefore suggest that the point estimate of the
diﬀerence in price-response asymmetry is positive in all weeks except week 2.25 The negative
diﬀerence in week 2 is also revealed in panel c, where we see the two mean predictive
asymmetries crossing over at 2 weeks after the cost shock. I am also able to derive the
probability that the diﬀerence in asymmetries is positive by looking at the amount of mass
in each boxplot for each week that lies above 0. In weeks 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, it appears that
roughly 60% or more of the mass lies above zero, suggesting that the posterior probability
that salary-operated stations have a wider asymmetry in price response to a cost shock
than if they were lessee-dealer stations is at least 60% in those weeks.26 While I would
hesitate to describe this as deﬁnitive evidence that companies achieve greater price-response
asymmetries with their salary-operated stations–for which they have complete control over
the pricing decisions–than their lessee-dealer stations–for which they have only imperfect
pricing control through DTW prices–it is suggestive of at least a small eﬀect.
Yet it is not surprising that I am unable to precisely determine a marginal eﬀect from
being a salary-operated station, insofar as this is not a spatial dimension for which I expect
customers to be concerned about or even aware of. I have included operation types in the
analysis to control for cost variation in the data across stations, and present the results
just described to illustrate the diagrammatic approach that I take in this paper to describe
the predictive marginal eﬀects. For the majority of the remaining station characteristics, I
generally ﬁnd highly suggestive evidence, and occasionally deﬁnitive evidence, that spatial
diﬀerentiation does inﬂuence a station’s price-response asymmetry.
25Under quadratic loss, the optimal Bayesian point estimate is the posterior mean, while under symmetric
linear (absolute) loss, the optimal Bayesian point estimate is the posterior median.
26This is a subjective probability statement. It is the conditional probability that results from applying
Bayes rule to update the prior distributions described in the appendix with the likelihood function described
by the data and the hierarchical ECM model presented in this paper. In general (except for θ, which is
discussed in Section 3), my prior distribution is highly diﬀuse and should be widely acceptable as a "public"
prior.
22The ﬁrst major characteristic that I look at is the eﬀect of brand identity on asymmetry.
Figure 6a charts the predictive price-response asymmetry for 4 groups of brand identities
in the data. I separate Arco and Mobil from the other branded and unbranded stations
because they each have unique operating structures that distinguish them from the other
brands. Speciﬁcally, both tend to prefer Lessee-Dealer or salary-operated contracts with
their stations, largely avoiding the jobber and independent organizational types. In the
case of Mobil, it appears that the resulting greater control over pricing leads to an early
spike in the price-response asymmetry, with retail prices rising much faster in the ﬁrst week
after a positive cost shock than they fall after a negative cost shock. As with the overall
average asymmetry, the asymmetry vanishes in the second week, but reappears a week later
and diminishes toward zero afterward.
In Figure 6b, I call attention to the diﬀerence in price-response asymmetries between
the branded (Chevron, Shell, and Unocal 76) and the unbranded stations. According to
the predictive densities, it appears that branded stations have a far greater price-response
asymmetry than the unbranded stations in the ﬁrst 9 weeks after a cost shock, after which
point the unbranded stations have a greater, albeit small in magnitude, asymmetry than
the branded stations. In monetary terms, for branded stations the diﬀerence peaks three
weeks after a cost shock, where prices after a cost increase tend to rise by more than 30
cents greater than they fall for a corresponding negative shock For unbranded stations,
this diﬀerence is less than 15 cents, and the diﬀerence between the two groups is estimated
at nearly 20 cents.
If we interpret the asymmetry as a cost the consumer bears by frequenting a particular
station, then the results suggest with almost 90% certainty that consumers pay more relative
to a cost decrease in the ﬁrst several weeks after a cost shock by purchasing from branded
stations than they would pay if they purchased from unbranded stations. Moreover, if the
underlying process by which the asymmetry occurs is via implicit collusion, it would appear
that it breaks down much more rapidly for unbranded stations than branded, consistent
with the notion that tacit collusion is easier to maintain for stations with more relative
23market power.
In Figure 7, I look at the issue of spatial diﬀerentiation more directly by looking at the
beneﬁt of geographic isolation for a station. Speciﬁcally, I identify those stations which
have no rival stations within 0.1 miles, which in this data set amounts to those stations
which do not share an intersection with another competitor. The solid line in Figure 7a
plots the mean of the predicted asymmetry from a $1 cost shock for these stations. I then
consider the predicted outcome on this asymmetry from adding a rival station within 0.1
miles, which I plot as the dotted line Figure 7a. For the ﬁrst two weeks after a cost shock,
both geographic types exhibit a similar predicted asymmetry. But after the third week, the
asymmetry for the station with an additional immediate rival is lower by approximately 7
cents. Even more revealing is the relative precision with which this diﬀerence in asymmetry
is estimated. In Figure 7b, we see that after week 3 the majority of the posterior predictive
mass lies above zero. In fact, the posterior probability that the eﬀect of immediate isolation
for these stations is positive exceeds 90% in weeks 4 through 12. As with the positive
eﬀect of branding on price-response asymmetry, the results on the beneﬁts of isolation also
suggest that market power increases the tacitly collusive equilibrium price if the underlying
mechanism driving the asymmetry is tacit cooperation among station managers.
Ia l s ol o o ka tt h em a r g i n a le ﬀects on price-response asymmetry of site-speciﬁc character-
istics in Figure 8. Perhaps surprisingly, the results suggest that while there is a predictive
positive diﬀerence in asymmetry for a station located one standard deviation (about 2.5
miles in my data) further from the nearest open-access freeway for all post-shock weeks
after the ﬁrst, the diﬀerence is never signiﬁcant in the sense of statistical precision except
perhaps for 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 weeks after, and never strongly signiﬁcant in the economic
sense. Having a traﬃc light for at least one driveway appears to increase the predictive
asymmetry, although the diﬀerence in the ﬁrst 2 weeks after a cost shock probably oﬀsets
the high diﬀerence in the following couple of weeks from a cost-to-the-consumer perspective.
Still, it appears that easier access into and out of a station is a notable dimension of spatial
diﬀerentiation, with higher degrees of asymmetry of at least a few cents and as many as
2415-20 cents persisting after the third week following a cost shock.
Stations which bundle a convenience store with their gasoline business also appear to
spatially distinguish themselves from their competitors, although as with a driveway traﬃc
light, it appears that there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect in the ﬁrst few weeks, after which point
the higher asymmetry associated with convenience store stations persists and is signiﬁcant
in the statistical sense. Together with the result for driveway traﬃc lights, it appears that
stations with these characteristics are better able to maintain higher prices after a cost
decrease than stations which do not have these characteristics, suggesting that collusive
pricing may be less stable for the set of stations without these characteristics.
A stronger economic ﬁnding occurs with stations that have a one standard deviation
higher density of pumps on their lot than other stations. To the extent that this is indicative
of consumers’ higher preferences for shorter wait times, this result again suggests a positive
impact of spatial diﬀerentiation on price-response asymmetry. But it should be noted
that estimating the coeﬃcients on the number of pumps (per acre) is complicated by an
endogeneity problem of the usual supply and demand kind. If stations enjoy any kind of
volume discount, then their per-unit cost may be falling in the volume of customers they
can serve, which is probably directly related to the number of pumps they have at their site.
Still, regardless of the appropriate dimension, the ﬁnding is economically and statistically
strong that price-response asymmetry is increasing in relative pump density.
Figure 9 describes the results of the predictive analysis for some of the local-market
characteristics. Panel a oﬀers an especially interesting comparison with respect to the tacit
collusion theory described in Section 2. When rival stations are close enough to have their
prices visible from each other’s stations, it appears that higher collusive pricing may be
easier to maintain in the ﬁrst couple of weeks following a cost shock, but that afterward
the beneﬁt of price visibility in maintaining higher collusive prices disappears. Somewhat
surprisingly, I also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on asymmetry for being located in a shopping
center, where one might suppose there would be higher consumer demand. A possible
explanation for this is that when a station is located in a shopping center, there tends to
25be another one in close proximity, even if it is not directly visible.
I also include local demographics in Figure 9. The result in panel c that stations
located near block groups with larger population sizes tend to have a wider price-response
asymmetry is expected conditional on the hypothesis that spatial diﬀerentiation increases a
station’s relative market power. The peculiarity is in panel d with the predicted marginal
eﬀect of an increase in local household income. All else held equal, I would expect that if
greater local market power does increase a station’s price-response asymmetry, then being
located to consumers with more income should widen the asymmetry, not shrink it.
A possible economic explanation for a negative income eﬀect derives from the ﬁndings
in previous studies, particularly Barron et al. (2003), that higher-grade gasoline is more
price elastic than lower grade, and that substitution eﬀects dominate over income eﬀects
with regard to gasoline pricing. The idea is that high-income consumers typically are more
likely to buy high grade gasoline, but when prices rise sharply switch from high grade to
low grade gasoline. This ﬁnding may extend to the broader gasoline market, so that higher
income consumers are more likely in general to shop around for lower prices when prices
are high, and thereby making it more diﬃcult to maintain tacitly collusive pricing when
wholesale prices fall.
On balance, the predictive results suggest that those local market and site character-
istics which increase a station’s local market power also tend to widen its price-response
asymmetry. Eﬀective station characteristics, in particular brand identity and larger local
population sizes, and to a lesser extent improved ease-of-access and the oﬀering of a con-
venience store, are associated with faster cost pass through when costs increase and slower
cost pass-through when costs decrease. The ﬁnding that having a competitor in close prox-
imity also shrinks the price-response asymmetry adds further credence to the suggestion
that the mechanism by which local market power inﬂuences asymmetry may be related
to the concept that markets composed of spatially close stations form less stable collusive
regimes than markets composed of spatially distant stations.
265 Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research
In this study I examine the potential inﬂuence of spatial diﬀerentiation, and by extension,
local market power, on the well documented empirical phenomenon that gasoline prices rise
faster for a cost increase than they fall for a comparable cost decrease. Using a highly
detailed station-level data set, I establish in this paper that price-response asymmetry is
a dominant feature of the data. I then show that stations with speciﬁc site and local-
market characteristics are associated with higher price-response asymmetry than stations
without (or with lower levels of) these characteristics. To the extent that these spatial
characteristics increase each station’s potential local market power, the results suggest that
market power does indeed augment price-response asymmetry.
These results also indicate a possible direction for future analyses of price-response
asymmetry. A direct approach to measuring the eﬀect of market power explicitly on
price-response asymmetry would be to compare the asymmetry across diﬀerent observed
levels of market power. One of the most common measures of market power is the Lerner
index, the creation of which without a structural demand model requires highly accurate
cost data. This study circumvents the problem of inadequate station-level cost data by
looking at spatial diﬀerentiation, which is assumed to positively inﬂuence a station’s market
power. Another option, which was attempted here but proved unsuccessful, is to acquire
both DTW and rack pricing and construct a more accurate estimate of each station’s cost.
Alternatively, the econometric literature on the errors-in-variables problem with spot or rack
prices as an inaccurate but positively correlated proxy for marginal costs could yield useful
results. To have any statistical precision, such an approach would require a set of strong
instruments to identify the correct cost eﬀects and, by extension, the implied markups.
A further alternative is to combine the procedure here with a structural demand model
that backs out own-price elasticities for each station, which would provide another method
for estimating the Lerner index measure of market power. However, due to the common
lack of good, or even any, quantity data at the station level, a natural inclination for the
27researcher attempting a structural analysis is to assert a static equilibrium model that iden-
tiﬁes the underlying structural equations in spite of the missing quantity information. The
complication facing this approach is that the industry has an obvious dynamic component.
Indeed, the dynamic pricing of gasoline stations is the subject of study, and so the usual
methods that achieve identiﬁcation through a static game would seem inappropriate. While
the static game might change over time in a systematic manner, it would be diﬃcult to ar-
g u et h a tt h estatic game in period t was a function of outcomes or states in earlier periods.
In this case, the appropriate structure is not a static model, but a dynamic one.
28Appendix
A.1 Specifying a prior distribution for the basic ECM
For this stage of the analysis, there is a surprising wealth of prior information on the
parameters of the model and the asymmetry I expect to see in the data a priori. Largely,
this information derives from the existing literature, in particular BCG and Lewis (2003).
The long-run parameters are the simplest to elicit. By way of construction, estimation
of (the nonrandom parameters) e αs and θ is eased by formation of a matrix composed of a
constant, S−1 station dummies, and the vector of one-period lagged costs for each station.
Thus e α0 is the markup for the excluded station, which I describe with a normal density,
centered at 0.8 with a variance of 5; the remaining S − 1 station dummy coeﬃcients are
centered at 0, also with a variance of 5. I interpret this prior information as being highly
diﬀuse, centered at reasonable a priori values. Diﬀuseness, however, is an inappropriate
speciﬁcation for the long-run price response to costs represented in θ.B C G e s t i m a t e θ at
nearly 1 with small standard errors, while Lewis ultimately rejects the estimated values of
θ and imposes θ =1with certainty. I take a middle-of-the-road approach and continue to
estimate θ, but with a highly informative prior centered at 1 and a variance suggested by
the "six-sigma" rule, i.e., with a prior standard deviation of 0.1/6. In words, this translates
to a prior belief that I am nearly certain (probability 0.99) that θ lies between 0.9 and 1.1.
For the short-run response parameters e β and e γ, Ir e v e r tt od i ﬀuseness with cues taken
from BCG. I condition the analysis on J =3and K =2 ,w h i c hr e s u l t si n3c o s t - d i ﬀerence
regressors and 2 price-diﬀerence regressors. My prior on e β0, e β1 and e γ1 is such that negative
changes are centered at 0, while positive changes are centered at 0.1, reﬂecting an a priori
expectation of a positive asymmetry diﬀerence. Uncertainty about the appropriateness of
the additional lags leads me to center all of the coeﬃcients in e β2 and e γ2 at zero. For all
of the short-run changes in cost and price coeﬃcients, the variance is set at 5, which again
represents a diﬀuse speciﬁcation that highly favors the likelihood information over the prior.
For the short-run response to the deviation from equilibrium, λ, I specify a normal prior
29density centered at -0.5 with a variance of 1, suggesting a nearly certain prior belief that
λ is negative and favoring a relatively quick return to the long-run equilibrium relationship
between retail prices and wholesale costs.
Lastly, I assume that the residual in the regression, ust, is N
¡
0,σ2¢
, and thus require
a prior speciﬁcation for the residual variance term in addition to the coeﬃcients described
above. Recall the usual speciﬁcation for goodness of ﬁt, R2 =1− SSE/SST, where
SSE is the sum of squared errors and SST is the total sum of squares. Also recall the
classical estimator for σ2,s 2 = SSE/(N − L), where L is the total number of regressors.
Combining this information one can rewrite s2 =
¡
1 − R2¢
SST/(N − L). Thus given
prior beliefs about goodness of ﬁt and the underlying variance in the data, I center my
distribution for σ2 at my prior expectation of s2. Additionally, since I specify an inverse




integer value that ν can be to ensure a prior mean is 3, which is the value I use in this
study. Speciﬁcally, I center my prior information on the residual variance near the implied
value for s2 that results from R2 =0 .25 and SST the actual variance in the data times the
sample size. But since ν =3 , this results in a prior distribution that, like those for the
coeﬃcients above, is highly diﬀuse. Indeed, it places so much weight in the tails of the
distribution that the prior variance of σ2 is not ﬁnite.27
A.2 Posterior estimation and output of the basic ECM
I estimate the ECM with asymmetry described in Section 3.1 via the Gibbs sampler, which
allows me to obtain draws from the joint distribution of all the parameters using straight-
forward Bayesian linear regression techniques. This procedure has the added beneﬁtt h a tI
estimate the long- and short-run parameters jointly without having to rely on the two-stage
27A valid critique of this prior elicitation procedure for σ
2 is that it is "data informed." Speciﬁcally, I
condition on SST = Σst (pst − p), which clearly depends on the price data. But the elicitation itself is very
intuitive. It amounts to a prior expectation for both R
2 and the underlying variance in the data. The
diﬃculty comes in that the data variance is a basic descriptive statistic that the researcher will always know
before estimation of the model, and which is information he cannot forget when constructing prior beliefs
about the model’s ﬁt. In a practical sense, this procedure results in centering the prior for σ
2 at no more
than the underlying variance in the data–how much less than the underlying variance is presumably based
on non-data information about R
2.
30Engle and Granger (1987) procedure. As an added beneﬁt, I also avoid having to rely on
asymptotic results for the predictive analysis inherent in deriving the cumulative response
and asymmetry functions–the posterior distribution of the parameters, and subsequently
the posterior distributions of both CRFt+f and At+f, is an exact, ﬁnite sample distribution.
The Gibbs routine itself proceeds in the following manner:
1. Initialize e β
(0)
, e γ(0), e α(0),θ (0),λ (0) and σ2( 0 ) . Then, for m =1 ,...,M:
2. Draw e β
(m)
,e γ(m)|y, e α(m−1),λ (m−1),θ (m−1),σ 2( m−1)
3. Draw λ(m),θ(m)|y, e β
(m)
,e γ(m),σ 2( m−1)
4. Draw e α(m)|y, e β
(m)
,e γ(m),λ (m),θ(m),σ 2( m−1)
5. Draw σ2( m)|y, e β
(m)
,e γ(m), e α(m),θ(m)
The simplicity of the Gibbs algorithm is particularly useful in this exercise, since con-
ditional on the long-run parameters, e β and e γ are just the coeﬃcients in a linear regression
with known variance.28 Likewise, conditional on the short-run parameters, e α and θ are
also just coeﬃcients in a linear regression with known variance. Hence each step in the
Gibbs routine is no more diﬃcult than standard Bayesian linear regression, and after con-
vergence, all of the draws represent valid draws from the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters. The results of the Gibbs routine for the basic asymmetry model that uses all
of the stations are summarized below in Table A1.
A.3 Specifying a prior distribution for the hierarchical ECM
For the hierarchical ECM, I generalize the prior distribution described above to imply the
same basic information about the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients as when they were nonrandom and
equal across stations. For ease of exposition, let ξs denote an arbitrary coeﬃcient in the
ﬁrst-stage regression (e.g., e β
−
0,s or e γ+
2,s). Recall the distributional assumption on these






28See Poirier (1995) for an explanation of estimation in the standard Bayesian linear regression model.
31the original setup with ξs = ξ, when ξ was e β
−
0 , e β
−
1 or e γ−
1 , I centered the prior at zero, while
for the associated positive eﬀects the prior was centered at 0.1. I maintain that speciﬁcation
through the prior on ξ∗. Since ws contains a constant plus a set of station-level covariates,
about which I want the data to be the primary source of information, I center ξ∗ so that
for the negative ﬁrst-stage eﬀects, ξ∗ =0 , while for the positive ﬁrst-stage eﬀects, the ﬁrst
element of ξ∗ (the coeﬃcient on the constant in ws) is 0.1, while the remaining elements
are centered at 0. As with the basic model, I also specify a prior variance for ξ∗ of 5, with
no a priori expectation of covariance between each coeﬃcient. Under a normal prior then,





h a se l e m e n t sa sj u s td e s c r i b e da b o v ea n dIn is the identity matrix of size n. Additionally,
since I do not want to a priori enforce large heterogeneity in responses, I set σ2
ξ at 0.01. In
the stacked vector e βs that was presented in Section 4.1, this information on σ2
ξ combined
with no a priori expectation of correlation between the diﬀerent eﬀects results in a prior
centering of Σ at 0.01I(J+K). Under an inverse Wishart prior for Σ, the minimum prior
degrees of freedom that ensures a prior mean is J + K +3 , which I utilize here in order to
remain diﬀuse about the degree of heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients.
I also must specify prior information on the coeﬃcients on the long-run deviation para-
meter λs. I maintain that it should be centered at −0.5, which implies that wsλ∗ should be
centered at −0.5.A s w i t h ξ∗, I achieve this by setting the coeﬃcient on the constant to have
a prior mean of −0.5, while the remaining coeﬃcients are centered at 0. I also preserve the
prior variance from the ﬁrst section, so that under a normality assumption, λ∗ ∼ N (λ∗,I L),
with λ∗ as just described. Again, I do not want to introduce heterogeneity in the λs in-





centrality parameter s2 set at 0.01 and ν =3to emphasize diﬀuseness.
An analogous prior distribution is speciﬁed for θs. Because I want wsθ∗ to be centered
at 1 with small variance, I set the ﬁrst element of θ∗ to be 1 and the remaining coeﬃcients
at 0, and then place a prior variance on each element of θ∗ of 0.1/6, similar to the prior for
the basic model. The prior information on σ2
θ is identical to that for σ2
λ.
32Last among the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients is the prior information on the long-run markup
parameters e αs. I still expect an average markup of retail over spot price of about 80c /. As
above, I set the ﬁrst element of α∗ to be 0.8 and the remaining parameters at 0, and each






. These parameters must remain in the positive domain to ensure a stable and
positive deﬁnite covariance matrix A. For this reason, I work with the reparameterized vec-






, about which I assume a normal prior centered at log(0.1,0.1,0.01)
with prior covariance matrix I3. With φα centered at 0.01, there is a strong a priori belief
that the correlation in markups between stations depends inversely on the distance be-
tween them, although with the prior information on τ2
α and σ2
α, the expected correlation is
bounded above by 0.5.
Finally, with regard to the residual variance, I maintain the original speciﬁcation from
above. The only diﬀerence is that I expect the ﬁt to improve and that the number of
eﬀective regressors has increased from J +K +S +2to S (J + K +3 ). I increase my prior
expectation of R2 from 0.25 to 0.75, in accordance with the expectation that adding each
of the station eﬀects will sharply improve ﬁt relative to the basic ECM.
A.4 Posterior estimation and output of the hierarchical ECM
Chib and Carlin (1999) describe the basic algorithm for estimating a hierarchical model like
the one employed here. I modify this algorithm to account for the nonlinear procedure
that led to the Gibbs sampler in Section A.2. For all of the parameters except e αs and
ρ, because of the near-conjugacy of my prior this is a trivial extension to the basic Gibbs
sampler. The only complication for e αs is that unlike the other parameters in the model,
the nonindependence between station eﬀects implies that I must draw the entire vector of
coeﬃcients together. Letting
yst = −





33then stacking up the Ts time observations for station s, we have
ys = ιse αs + vs,
where ιs denotes a Ts vector of ones. Further letting I = blockdiag ({ιs}), we obtain the
full vector of stacked observations (ﬁrst over time, then over station)
y = Ie α + v.





and y =( y1,...yS)
0 equal the
vector of sample averages over time of ys for each station. Then following Lindley and
Smith (1972), we have that e α|y,σ2





d = T y/σ2
u + A−1Wα∗.
Given a draw for e α, I obtain a draw for α∗ in the usual way. But the Gibbs sampler cannot
be used to obtain a draw for ρ, and so for this study I rely on the Metropolis Hastings







and the hyperparameters ρ and V ρ are discussed in Section A.3 above.
Regarding ﬁnal output of the results, I mentioned in the text that there are far too many
parameters–403 coeﬃcient parameters, the 10x10 matrix Σ, the two variance parameters
associated with λs and θs, and the three covariance function parameters ρ in A–for me to
present a summary of all results in this paper, although I can provide them to the interested
reader upon request. A few parameters are worth discussing, however. In particular, I ﬁnd
a posterior mean for φα of 0.0039 with a posterior standard deviation of 0.003. Together
with the other parameters in ρ, this implies that the correlation between stations that are
1 mile apart is 0.975, while the correlation between stations that are 5 miles apart is 0.961.
34I ﬁnd this to be surprising slow decay, and take it as evidence of the inappropriateness of
an independence assumption in the markups.
Also, I continue to ﬁnd, as with the basic ECM, that θs is estimated to be signiﬁcantly
greater than 1. In fact, the distribution over s of the posterior mean of each θs is centered
at 1.36 with a standard deviation of 0.11, implying that for the average station, when costs
rise by 10c /, its price rises by 13.6c /. However, there is considerable variation across stations:
the station at the 25th percentile has an estimated θs of 1.27 while for the station at the
75th percentile this value is 1.43. One implication of this is that the markup, p − c, is
not simply just the parameter e α, but rather e α +( θ − 1)c. In Table A2, I summarize the
predicted marginal eﬀects of each of the station characteristics on the estimated markup of
retail over wholesale spot prices when the spot price is $1.
35Tables & Figures
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (In Dollars)
Average St. Dev. Min Max n
Retail Price 1.794 0.223 1.439 2.359 4466
Wholesale Price 0.944 0.160 0.719 1.503 46
Retail Price Change 0.006 0.054 -0.360 0.280 4109
Wholesale Price Change 0.002 0.066 -0.183 0.170 45
Pos. Retail Price Change 0.061 0.033 < 0.001 0.280 1448
Neg. Retail Price Change∗ -0.026 0.035 -0.360 0 2661
Pos. Wholesale Price Change 0.042 0.038 0.001 0.170 27
Neg. Wholesale Price Change -0.058 0.052 -0.183 -0.004 18
∗ Includes 1060 no-change observations.
36Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Station Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Arco 0.126 - - -
Chevron 0.227 - - -
Mobil 0.185 - - -
Shell 0.134 - - -
Texaco* 0.076 - - -
Unocal 76 0.160 - - -
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles 0.437 0.630 0.000 2.0000
Number Rivals 0.1 to 0.5 Miles 1.092 1.390 0.000 7.0000
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles 1.345 1.429 0.000 7.0000
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.413 0.530 0.029 2.6155
Independent Owned 0.286 - - -
Jobber Owned 0.084 - - -
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer 0.403 - - -
Major Owned: Salary Operated 0.227 - - -
Distance from Freeway 2.121 2.436 0.016 8.910
Pumps per Acre 24.147 10.605 8.534 61.952
Lot Size 0.467 0.181 0.129 0.918
Carwash 0.294 - - -
Service Station 0.252 - - -
Convenience Store 0.504 - - -
Island Kiosk 0.034 - - -
Visible Competitor Prices 0.412 - - -
Visible Freeway Sign 0.076 - - -
No. Driveways 2.311 0.828 1.000 4.000
Shopping Center 0.479 - - -
Traffic Light 0.101 - - -
Divided Primary Arterial 0.496 - - -
Nearby Residential 0.496 - - -
Nearby Commercial 0.412 - - -
Population Size 1.503 0.285 0.936 2.086
Population Density 6.527 1.877 0.337 11.180
Housing Density 2.738 1.031 0.184 4.768
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles 2.801 3.251 0.812 23.867
Median Household Income 73.668 14.578 39.430 108.470
Median Rent 1.127 0.143 0.885 1.455
*From November 2002 to January 2003, all of the Texaco Stations were switched to Shell.
37Table 3
Mean Predictive Effects of Covariates on Rate of Return to Long-Run Equilibrium
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pr( > 0 )
Constant -0.176 0.134 0.088
Arco 0.063 0.039 0.945
Chevron -0.021 0.037 0.281
Mobil 0.031 0.040 0.795
Shell -0.023 0.041 0.284
Texaco -0.065 0.049 0.093
Unocal 76 -0.002 0.039 0.486
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles -0.005 0.018 0.374
Number Rivals 0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.015 0.006 0.995
Number Rivals .5 to 1.0 Miles 0.005 0.007 0.755
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.010 0.019 0.687
Independent Owned 0.005 0.037 0.539
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer -0.009 0.042 0.393
Major Owned: Salary Operated -0.008 0.039 0.400
Distance from Freeway -0.001 0.004 0.464
Pumps per Acre 0.000 0.001 0.553
Lot Size -0.001 0.067 0.495
Carwash 0.044 0.023 0.965
Service Station 0.016 0.020 0.793
Convenience Store 0.010 0.017 0.712
Island Kiosk -0.065 0.053 0.110
Visible Competitor Prices 0.031 0.027 0.871
Visible Freeway Sign 0.017 0.034 0.691
No. Driveways -0.007 0.013 0.271
Shopping Center -0.001 0.020 0.508
Traffic Light -0.055 0.035 0.049
Divided Primary Arterial -0.003 0.018 0.428
Nearby Residential -0.003 0.020 0.459
Nearby Commercial -0.022 0.018 0.116
Population Size -0.018 0.035 0.313
Population Density -0.009 0.006 0.082
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.008 0.004 0.014
Median Household Income 0.000 0.001 0.579
Posterior Distribution
38Table A1
Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Dependent Variable: ∆Retailt Posterior






































































0.267 0.035 > 0.999
Long Run Cost Response (θ)1 .376 0.023 > 0.999
Long Run Deviation (λ) −0.265 0.007 < 0.001
Regression Std.Dev. 0.00109 0.00002 1
39Table A2
Mean Predictive Effects of Covariates on Markups (Retail - Spot Price)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pr( > 0 )
Constant 0.756 0.2301 > 0.999
Arco 0.011 0.034 0.631
Chevron 0.061 0.028 0.982
Mobil 0.053 0.033 0.937
Shell 0.031 0.034 0.816
Texaco 0.033 0.034 0.832
Unocal 76 0.065 0.032 0.976
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles 0.026 0.020 0.903
Number Rivals 0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.002 0.007 0.626
Number Rivals .5 to 1.0 Miles 0.005 0.007 0.760
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.001 0.019 0.531
Independent Owned 0.004 0.031 0.553
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer 0.003 0.036 0.531
Major Owned: Salary Operated -0.010 0.033 0.371
Distance from Freeway 0.003 0.005 0.691
Pumps per Acre -0.002 0.001 0.009
Lot Size -0.086 0.059 0.072
Carwash 0.019 0.018 0.858
Service Station -0.006 0.016 0.356
Convenience Store 0.007 0.014 0.693
Island Kiosk -0.050 0.042 0.120
Visible Competitor Prices -0.016 0.025 0.263
Visible Freeway Sign 0.015 0.034 0.676
No. Driveways 0.002 0.010 0.576
Shopping Center 0.006 0.015 0.658
Traffic Light 0.012 0.029 0.668
Divided Primary Arterial -0.002 0.015 0.447
Nearby Residential -0.004 0.016 0.396
Nearby Commercial -0.001 0.015 0.480
Population Size 0.001 0.033 0.513
Population Density -0.003 0.006 0.332
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.003 0.003 0.193
Median Household Income 0.001 0.001 0.930
Posterior Distribution
40Table A3
Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 ) Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 )
Constant 0.5891 0.3119 0.9678 -1.0901 0.5631 0.0458
Arco -0.1386 0.0912 0.0936 0.1797 0.1261 0.9116
Chevron -0.1063 0.0696 0.0826 0.1475 0.1066 0.9188
Mobil -0.1479 0.0988 0.0802 0.4006 0.1560 0.9788
Shell -0.0802 0.1141 0.2136 0.1035 0.1687 0.7426
Texaco 0.0432 0.0993 0.6376 -0.1125 0.1488 0.2656
Unocal -0.0820 0.1035 0.2158 0.2274 0.1568 0.9016
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles 0.0527 0.0449 0.8738 -0.0936 0.0845 0.1536
Number Rivals0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.0217 0.0181 0.8492 -0.0421 0.0327 0.1422
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles 0.0159 0.0201 0.7332 -0.0359 0.0323 0.1778
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.0076 0.0452 0.5590 0.0232 0.0836 0.6628
Independent Owned -0.0257 0.0884 0.3388 0.0195 0.1466 0.6018
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer -0.0015 0.1088 0.4586 0.0490 0.1874 0.5598
Major owned: Salary Operated -0.0097 0.1038 0.4670 0.0933 0.1914 0.6708
Distance from Freeway 0.0117 0.0084 0.9038 -0.0199 0.0140 0.0784
Pumps Per Acre -0.0072 0.0023 0.0052 0.0140 0.0038 1.0000
Lot Size -0.0102 0.1631 0.5402 0.1991 0.2696 0.7488
Carwash 0.0409 0.0419 0.8244 -0.0899 0.0756 0.1044
Service Station 0.0188 0.0384 0.7018 -0.0353 0.0705 0.3248
Convenience Store 0.0111 0.0388 0.5984 0.0031 0.0714 0.5682
Island Kiosk 0.4730 0.0861 1.0000 -0.8103 0.1286 0.0000
Visible Competitor Prices -0.1422 0.0720 0.0028 0.2623 0.1152 0.9956
Visible Freeway Sign -0.0532 0.1033 0.3190 0.1116 0.1593 0.7758
No. Driveways 0.0251 0.0293 0.8282 -0.0207 0.0547 0.3946
Shopping Center 0.0045 0.0343 0.5288 0.0890 0.0606 0.9210
Traffic Light 0.0878 0.0673 0.9046 -0.0282 0.1225 0.4244
Divided Primary Arterial 0.0326 0.0471 0.7352 -0.1326 0.0771 0.0290
Nearby Residential 0.0773 0.0588 0.8934 -0.1092 0.0996 0.1220
Nearby Commercial -0.0006 0.0363 0.5126 0.0533 0.0686 0.7530
Population Size -0.0620 0.0650 0.1848 0.1185 0.1218 0.8040
Population Density -0.0175 0.0169 0.1528 0.0411 0.0257 0.9396
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.0128 0.0059 0.0082 0.0277 0.0093 1.0000
Median Household Income -0.0007 0.0022 0.3486 0.0024 0.0038 0.7474
Standard Deviation 0.0164 0.0018 1.0000 0.0168 0.0019 1.0000
Δct Δct > 0
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Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 ) Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 )
Constant -0.4356 0.3775 0.1026 1.1344 0.4799 1.0000
Arco 0.1590 0.0971 0.9580 -0.0557 0.1501 0.3756
Chevron 0.0605 0.0851 0.7370 -0.2016 0.1345 0.0660
Mobil 0.2851 0.0729 1.0000 -0.6174 0.1108 0.0000
Shell 0.1232 0.1083 0.8674 -0.1475 0.1635 0.1846
Texaco 0.0247 0.1758 0.6374 0.1058 0.2380 0.5702
Unocal 0.1206 0.0879 0.9176 -0.2481 0.1537 0.0424
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles -0.0076 0.0461 0.4600 0.0210 0.0699 0.6032
Number Rivals0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.0194 0.0146 0.9034 0.0188 0.0243 0.7910
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles 0.0094 0.0228 0.5966 0.0159 0.0364 0.6580
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.0029 0.0462 0.5444 0.0368 0.0667 0.7138
Independent Owned -0.0183 0.1020 0.4246 0.0617 0.1227 0.6756
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer -0.0446 0.1309 0.3812 0.0760 0.1663 0.6428
Major owned: Salary Operated -0.0208 0.1319 0.4214 -0.0457 0.1656 0.4328
Distance from Freeway -0.0238 0.0100 0.0136 0.0366 0.0190 0.9880
Pumps Per Acre 0.0024 0.0027 0.8216 -0.0055 0.0039 0.0672
Lot Size -0.1535 0.1831 0.1880 0.1813 0.2605 0.7830
Carwash 0.1097 0.0622 0.9496 -0.0359 0.0887 0.4080
Service Station 0.0265 0.0547 0.6522 0.0508 0.0728 0.7124
Convenience Store 0.0579 0.0514 0.8524 -0.0603 0.0702 0.2222
Island Kiosk -0.2411 0.1427 0.0520 0.5598 0.2074 1.0000
Visible Competitor Prices 0.1003 0.0987 0.7984 -0.1139 0.1263 0.2066
Visible Freeway Sign -0.0359 0.0953 0.3410 0.0029 0.1696 0.5084
No. Driveways 0.0135 0.0292 0.7024 -0.0297 0.0416 0.1824
Shopping Center -0.0687 0.0462 0.0948 0.0579 0.0897 0.7420
Traffic Light -0.0745 0.0901 0.2096 -0.0201 0.1005 0.4180
Divided Primary Arterial 0.0253 0.0546 0.6610 0.0132 0.0831 0.5682
Nearby Residential -0.0501 0.0507 0.1606 0.0941 0.0785 0.8814
Nearby Commercial 0.0012 0.0444 0.5172 -0.0997 0.0729 0.0532
Population Size 0.0586 0.0846 0.7586 -0.1773 0.1223 0.0822
Population Density 0.0001 0.0149 0.4840 -0.0398 0.0261 0.0972
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.0061 0.0074 0.2064 -0.0171 0.0113 0.0552
Median Household Income 0.0035 0.0031 0.8764 -0.0080 0.0041 0.0512
Standard Deviation 0.0171 0.0021 1.0000 0.0175 0.0022 1.0000
Δct-1 Δct-1 > 0
42Table A3
Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 ) Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 )
Constant -0.1340 0.3319 0.3740 0.3781 0.6236 0.6846
Arco -0.0001 0.1098 0.4624 0.0441 0.2039 0.5914
Chevron -0.0404 0.0829 0.3204 0.1409 0.1376 0.8376
Mobil -0.0788 0.1131 0.2544 0.3131 0.2083 0.9580
Shell -0.0970 0.1106 0.2380 0.2577 0.1938 0.9230
Texaco -0.2177 0.1255 0.0422 0.2745 0.2349 0.8796
Unocal -0.0588 0.1109 0.2898 0.1649 0.2034 0.7634
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles 0.0111 0.0526 0.5376 0.0615 0.1011 0.7518
Number Rivals0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.0114 0.0128 0.8050 0.0127 0.0272 0.7414
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles -0.0108 0.0131 0.2130 0.0359 0.0244 0.9580
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.0283 0.0426 0.7812 -0.0434 0.0688 0.2514
Independent Owned 0.0687 0.1064 0.7180 -0.1705 0.1999 0.1920
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer 0.0341 0.1077 0.6154 -0.0917 0.1997 0.3866
Major owned: Salary Operated 0.0628 0.1165 0.6720 -0.0736 0.2432 0.4658
Distance from Freeway 0.0141 0.0081 0.9504 -0.0282 0.0153 0.0372
Pumps Per Acre 0.0027 0.0027 0.8744 -0.0052 0.0052 0.1520
Lot Size 0.2269 0.1793 0.8806 -0.3461 0.3728 0.2412
Carwash -0.0438 0.0457 0.1766 0.1640 0.0868 0.9876
Service Station -0.0380 0.0540 0.2536 0.0944 0.1125 0.7958
Convenience Store -0.0157 0.0457 0.3596 0.0883 0.0967 0.7924
Island Kiosk -0.2836 0.1263 0.0288 0.4686 0.1946 0.9858
Visible Competitor Prices 0.0382 0.0778 0.6634 -0.0878 0.1519 0.3102
Visible Freeway Sign 0.0494 0.0773 0.7196 -0.1044 0.1264 0.2024
No. Driveways -0.0424 0.0275 0.0712 0.0771 0.0501 0.9442
Shopping Center 0.0795 0.0383 0.9860 -0.1407 0.0727 0.0338
Traffic Light -0.0438 0.0721 0.2622 0.0570 0.1208 0.6794
Divided Primary Arterial -0.0184 0.0368 0.3310 0.0657 0.0619 0.8336
Nearby Residential -0.0037 0.0597 0.4372 0.0321 0.0963 0.6526
Nearby Commercial -0.0083 0.0330 0.4004 -0.0100 0.0581 0.3912
Population Size -0.0332 0.0778 0.2972 0.0135 0.1538 0.5636
Population Density -0.0096 0.0183 0.2772 -0.0091 0.0293 0.4470
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.0048 0.0056 0.1976 -0.0091 0.0089 0.1616
Median Household Income -0.0011 0.0031 0.3812 0.0007 0.0060 0.5488
Standard Deviation 0.0178 0.0023 1.0000 0.0182 0.0025 1.0000
Δct-2 > 0 Δct-2
43Table A3
Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 ) Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 )
Constant -0.4486 0.5450 0.2618 0.7746 0.8294 0.7674
Arco 0.1657 0.1242 0.8910 -0.1372 0.1517 0.1610
Chevron -0.3391 0.1214 0.0000 0.5203 0.1494 1.0000
Mobil -0.0933 0.1261 0.2148 0.2119 0.1467 0.8876
Shell -0.1641 0.1131 0.0824 0.1187 0.1173 0.8458
Texaco -0.1654 0.1630 0.2008 0.0052 0.2584 0.5370
Unocal -0.1256 0.1245 0.1978 -0.0055 0.1663 0.5526
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles -0.0034 0.0868 0.4422 -0.0367 0.1247 0.4288
Number Rivals0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.0620 0.0231 1.0000 -0.0932 0.0369 0.0000
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles -0.0113 0.0175 0.2962 -0.0264 0.0305 0.1902
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.1087 0.0445 1.0000 -0.1256 0.0681 0.0206
Independent Owned 0.0188 0.1428 0.5424 -0.0595 0.2228 0.3978
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer -0.0153 0.1523 0.4234 -0.0484 0.2394 0.4608
Major owned: Salary Operated 0.0031 0.1525 0.4764 0.0286 0.2396 0.4852
Distance from Freeway -0.0145 0.0131 0.1248 -0.0030 0.0202 0.3772
Pumps Per Acre 0.0019 0.0034 0.6998 0.0041 0.0052 0.8140
Lot Size 0.0064 0.2351 0.5548 0.1923 0.3274 0.7136
Carwash 0.1783 0.0713 1.0000 -0.3603 0.1150 0.0000
Service Station 0.0745 0.0527 0.9204 -0.1136 0.0829 0.1166
Convenience Store 0.0630 0.0425 0.9244 -0.1252 0.0586 0.0002
Island Kiosk 0.0698 0.1475 0.6612 -0.3662 0.1851 0.0104
Visible Competitor Prices 0.0505 0.0912 0.6724 -0.0593 0.1219 0.3736
Visible Freeway Sign 0.0488 0.1090 0.6240 0.0403 0.1845 0.5494
No. Driveways 0.0411 0.0312 0.9422 -0.1004 0.0535 0.0014
Shopping Center -0.0394 0.0501 0.2140 0.0512 0.0720 0.7366
Traffic Light 0.0199 0.1146 0.6032 -0.1116 0.2033 0.3226
Divided Primary Arterial -0.0701 0.0647 0.1510 0.0201 0.0768 0.5444
Nearby Residential 0.0301 0.0606 0.6886 -0.0708 0.0879 0.2264
Nearby Commercial 0.0706 0.0500 0.9358 -0.0861 0.0813 0.1554
Population Size 0.1476 0.1191 0.9096 -0.2792 0.1597 0.0256
Population Density -0.0163 0.0296 0.3390 0.0452 0.0528 0.7486
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.0203 0.0089 0.0190 0.0409 0.0119 1.0000
Median Household Income 0.0015 0.0058 0.5316 -0.0009 0.0092 0.4850
Standard Deviation 0.0185 0.0026 1.0000 0.0189 0.0027 1.0000
Δpt-1 > 0 Δpt-1
44Table A3
Posterior Distribution of Regression Parameters
Variable
Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 ) Mean Std. Dev Pr( > 0 )
Constant -0.5755 0.4352 0.0978 0.9850 0.5591 0.9480
Arco 0.1407 0.1168 0.9070 -0.3163 0.1647 0.0124
Chevron 0.1170 0.0956 0.8868 -0.3182 0.1189 0.0018
Mobil 0.1122 0.1260 0.7992 -0.2487 0.1387 0.0708
Shell 0.1523 0.1318 0.8574 -0.2343 0.1991 0.1366
Texaco 0.0173 0.1347 0.5156 0.0752 0.1536 0.7662
Unocal 0.0977 0.0935 0.8516 -0.1019 0.1099 0.2162
Number Rivals < 0.1 Miles 0.1247 0.0781 0.9448 -0.2060 0.1174 0.0474
Number Rivals0.1 to 0.5 Miles 0.0333 0.0148 0.9904 -0.0195 0.0208 0.1880
Number Rivals 0.5 to 1.0 Miles 0.0395 0.0222 0.9518 -0.0320 0.0295 0.1312
Distance to Nearest Rival 0.0652 0.0594 0.8642 -0.0513 0.0937 0.3130
Independent Owned 0.0597 0.1290 0.6834 0.0528 0.1950 0.5496
Major owned: Lessee-Dealer 0.0214 0.1507 0.5248 0.0634 0.2307 0.6156
Major owned: Salary Operated 0.0807 0.1182 0.7372 -0.0707 0.1968 0.4244
Distance from Freeway 0.0094 0.0124 0.7872 0.0022 0.0139 0.5816
Pumps Per Acre 0.0008 0.0024 0.6410 -0.0033 0.0044 0.2344
Lot Size -0.1365 0.1809 0.2492 -0.0567 0.2389 0.4124
Carwash 0.0511 0.0769 0.7452 0.0367 0.1325 0.5412
Service Station -0.0556 0.0743 0.2470 0.0587 0.1310 0.6228
Convenience Store -0.0084 0.0475 0.4308 -0.0266 0.0488 0.2956
Island Kiosk -0.2670 0.1415 0.0302 0.5074 0.2183 0.9934
Visible Competitor Prices 0.0288 0.0914 0.6184 0.0335 0.1279 0.6798
Visible Freeway Sign 0.0648 0.0906 0.7718 -0.0948 0.1166 0.2030
No. Driveways 0.0276 0.0363 0.7308 0.0218 0.0458 0.6606
Shopping Center 0.0865 0.0656 0.8862 -0.1579 0.0879 0.0736
Traffic Light -0.1461 0.1014 0.0602 0.1577 0.1203 0.8990
Divided Primary Arterial 0.0522 0.0517 0.8214 0.0581 0.0596 0.8450
Nearby Residential -0.0944 0.0603 0.0556 0.1274 0.1092 0.8594
Nearby Commercial -0.0433 0.0616 0.2264 0.0663 0.0733 0.8096
Population Size 0.0517 0.1082 0.6416 -0.0114 0.1855 0.4992
Population Density -0.0109 0.0241 0.3140 -0.0119 0.0297 0.4184
Percent Commuting < 5 Miles -0.0109 0.0137 0.2050 0.0066 0.0179 0.7138
Median Household Income 0.0006 0.0024 0.6204 -0.0050 0.0035 0.0732
Standard Deviation 0.0192 0.0029 1.0000 0.0196 0.0030 1.0000
Δpt-2 > 0 Δpt-2
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Figure 2: Map of South Orange County and Gasoline Stations.











Figure 3: Plot of retail and wholesale spot prices for gasoline in South Orange County.








(a) Cumulative Response Function
Weeks After Wholesale Cost Shock
$








(b) Cumulative Response Asymmetry
Weeks After Wholesale Cost Shock
$
Negative Cost 
Shock         
Positive Cost 
Shock         
Figure 4: Plotting the eﬀect of a $1 cost shock. Panel a describes the path of cumulative
price changes for both a postive and a negative cost shock (modiﬁed to the positive domain).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Charting the eﬀect of a $1 cost shock for diﬀerent organization types: Salary-
operated versus lessee-dealer. Panel a describes the path of cumulative price changes for
a salary-operated station. Panel b describes the path if these stations were switched to
lessee-dealer. Panel c compares the diﬀerence in positive versus negative cost shocks for
both types, and panel d describes the diﬀerence between the two eﬀects from panel c.









Weeks After Cost Shock
$
Asymmetry by Brand Identity








Difference in Asymmetry: Branded minus Unbranded
$
Weeks After Cost Shock
Arco
Chevron, Shell, Unocal 76
Mobil
Unbranded
Figure 6: Charting the eﬀect of brand identity on price response asymmetry. Panel a
describes the diﬀerence in price responses for positive versus negative cost shocks across
diﬀerent brand types. Panel b plots the diﬀerence in asymmetries for branded versus un-
branded stations.




Weeks After Cost Shock
Marginal Effect of Nearby Competition on Asymmetry







Weeks After Cost Shock
Difference in Asymmetry: Adding a Rival Station Nearby
No Nearby Rivals
+1 Nearby Rival
Figure 7: Charting the eﬀect of rival proximity on price response asymmetry. Panel a
describes the diﬀerence in price responses for positive versus negative cost shocks for stations
with no immediate rivals and for stations with 1 rival added less than 0.1 miles away. Panel




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Charting the eﬀects of site-level characteristics on price response asymmetry.
Panels a and d describe the predictive change in price response asymmetry from increasing
the observed characteristic for each station by one standard deviation. Panels b and c




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Charting the eﬀects of local market-level characteristics on price response asym-
metry. Panels a and b describe the predictive change in price response asymmetry for
stations in having the observed characteristic versus removing it. Panels c and d describe
the predictive change from increasing the observed characteristic for each station by one
standard deviation.
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